IN THE CIRCUIT COURT OF OHIO COUNTY, WEST VIRGINIA

DIANA MEY,

Plaintiff,

vs.                        CIVIL ACTION NO. 03-C-592(W)

DISCOVER FINANCIAL SERVICES,
INC., a corporation,

Defendant.

CLOSING ARGUMENT FOR SEPTEMBER 14, 2006 JAMS ARBITRATION


    NOW COMES the plaintiff, Diana Mey, by counsel, James A. Byrum, Esq., and John M. Jurco, Esq., and pursuant to the Arbitrator’s September 14, 2006 instruction, hereby makes the following closing argument:
    SUMMARY

        1.  Discover Financial Services (“Discover”) conducted a telemarketing campaign in December, 2002 and 2003, the purpose of which was to solicit new cardholders.

        2.  In deciding who should be solicited for this offer, Discover obtained a list of credit-qualified individuals and then scrubbed that list of names of people who were unqualified for other reasons, including, but not limited to, being a current cardholder of Discover.

        3.  At the time of the campaign, Discover had in its possession 11.9 million phone numbers entrusted to them by cardmembers to be placed on a Do Not Call List (70% of the current 17 million cardholders on Discover's present Do Not Call List).

        4.  Discover was aware that, because of turnover in ownership of phone numbers, its solicitation list would  show more than one person owning the same phone number.

        5.  Discover did not scrub from its list the 11.9 million phone numbers on its Do Not Call List.

        6.  Testimony showed that 3 different individuals at 3 different addresses were on the Discover solicitation list as owning the phone number that in actuality was
owned by Diana Mey.

        7.  Diana Mey had been on the Do Not Call List of Discover since 2001.  On October 29, 2002, as shown by Discover's own records, Diana Mey informed Discover of her new phone number and reiterated that she did not wish to be solicited by telemarketing.

        8.  Although the October 29th do-not-call request should have been recorded immediately in Discover's records, it was not recorded until February 21, 2003.
However, Ms. Mey did receive a bill from Discover in December of 2002, which was sent to the new address she gave on October 29, 2002.

        9.  Because of its ineffective do-not-call system, and because Discover knowingly failed to scrub its solicitation list by using the phone numbers entrusted to it by its cardmembers, Diana Mey received four phone calls, each of which involved several violations of the Telephone Consumer Protection Act (“TCPA”), 47 U.S.C. § 227.  

        10.  Ms. Mey contends the calls were made on January 17, January 24, January 28 and January 30, 2003.  Discover alleges the January 17th call was not originated by it because there is no identification made by the caller and because it has no record of that call being made.  It should be noted, however, that Discover had no record of the January 28th call which it concedes was placed on its behalf.

        11.  Pursuant to the JAMS Streamlined Rules, Discover produced all relevant documentation relating to this case.  The documents relating to training that were produced made no reference to training telemarketers in the requirements of the TCPA.

        12.  Discover testified that it trained the trainers of the telemarketers.  Discover also controlled and monitored telemarketing phone calls and procedures of the third-party vendors who called Ms. Mey.

        13.  Because of the inadequate training and inadequate monitoring, the phone calls to Ms. Mey involved multiple violations of the TCPA.  Testimony showed that the illegal phone calls made to Ms. Mey were from multiple vendors.  Therefore, the inadequate training was systemic and not simply a result of one vendor improperly training its telemarketers.  

        14.  Because she received multiple calls, Ms. Mey is entitled to a private cause of action.  Discover asserts that they are not liable for any violations in the first call.  Its position contradicts the plain reading of the statute.  Once the second call was made, Discover became liable for all violations.  

        15.  Because Discover knowingly did not scrub its solicitation list with its own Do-not-call List, and because, through Discover's monitoring of telemarketers, it knew or should have known that the telemarketers were improperly trained,  and because it took Discover almost 4 months to record Ms. Mey's do-not-call request, Ms. Mey is entitled to triple statutory damages in the amount of $1,500.00 per violation in each of the four telephone calls.

        16.  Violations in the telephone calls are as follows:

                    I.    January 17, 2003 telephone call and violations therein
                    -    the solicitor did not honor Ms. Mey’s October 29, 2002 do-not-call request
                    -    the solicitor  failed to provide a contact telephone number or mailing address where he could be contacted
                    -    the solicitor failed to record Ms. Mey’s do-not-call request    
                    -    the solicitor failed to maintain a record of Ms. Mey’s do-not-call request
                    -    Discover failed to train the solicitor initiating the call in the existence and use of the do-not-call list
 
It bears noting that given  Discover’s subsequent calls to Ms. Mey’s residential telephone number on January 24, 28, and 30 in attempt to reach Ms. Mayer, it is more probable than not that the January 17th call was from Discover’s agents.  

                    II.    January 24, 2003 telephone call and violations therein
                    -    the solicitor did not honor Ms. Mey’s October 29, 2002 do-not-call request
                    -    the solicitor  failed to provide a contact telephone number or mailing address where he could be contacted
                    -    the solicitor failed to record Ms. Mey’s do-not-call request    
                    -    the solicitor failed to maintain a record of Ms. Mey’s do-not-call request
                    -    Discover failed to train the solicitor initiating the call in the existence and use of the do-not-call list
                    III.    January 28, 2003
                    -    the solicitor did not honor Ms. Mey’s October 29, 2002 do-not-call request
                    -    the solicitor  failed to provide a contact telephone number or mailing address where he could be contacted
                    -    the solicitor failed to record Ms. Mey’s do-not-call request    
                    -    the solicitor failed to maintain a record of Ms. Mey’s do-not-call request
                    -    Discover failed to train the solicitor initiating the call in the existence and use of the do-not-call list
                    IV.    January 30, 2003
                    -    the solicitor did not honor Ms. Mey’s October 29, 2002 do-not-call request
                    -    the solicitor  failed to provide a contact telephone number or mailing address where he could be contacted
                    -    although we alleged that the solicitor failed to record Ms. Mey’s do-not-call request, it appears from the records that he did record it.   
                    -    the solicitor failed to maintain a record of Ms. Mey’s do-not-call request
                    -    Discover failed to train the solicitor initiating the call in the existence and use of the do-not-call list
                    -    the solicitor failed to timely provide a copy of Discover’s written do-not-call policy when requested by Ms. Mey. Although Ms. Mey finally received a copy of the policy enclosed with a letter dated March 3, 2003 from Stacy J. Sandler, this was sent in response to a telephone conversation which occurred in late February, 2003.  
ARGUMENT

        The evidence and law in the case, as introduced through exhibit, testimonial, and pleading format, establishes that Ms. Mey is entitled to her requested relief under the TCPA, 47 U.S.C. 227.

(A)     Ms. Mey is entitled to recover on a per violation rather than a per call basis

        The TCPA statute reads in pertinent part as follows:  
       
        A person who has received more than one telephone call within any 12-month period by or on behalf of the same entity in violation of the regulations prescribed under this subsection may, if otherwise permitted by the laws or rules of court of a State bring in an appropriate court of that State –

        (A)    an action based on a violation of the regulations prescribed under this subsection to enjoin such violation,
 
        (B)    an action to recover for actual monetary loss from such a violation, or to receive up to $500 in damages for each such violation , whichever is greater, or
      
        (C)    both such actions.

        It shall be an affirmative defense in any action brought under this paragraph that the defendant has established and implemented, with due care, reasonable practices and procedures to effectively prevent telephone solicitations in violation of the regulations prescribed under this subsection.  If the court finds that the defendant willfully or knowingly violated the regulations prescribed under this subsection, the court may, in its discretion increase the amount of the award to an amount equal to not more than 3 times the amount available under subparagraph (B) of this paragraph.

        47 U.S.C. § 227(c)(5)(emphasis added).
       
        The statute authorizes recovery of $500 per statutory violation; it does not limit recovery on a per call basis regardless of the number of violations in the call.
The Eastern District of Virginia federal court implicitly recognized as much in Commonwealth of Virginia v. Real Time International, Inc., No. 4:04CV125, 2005 WL 1162937 (E.D. Va. April 16, 2005).  As discussed in Ms. Mey’s Pre-Hearing Arbitration Brief, the Commonwealth therein  filed a complaint and obtained default against Real Time for violations of the TCPA and state statutes.
        
        On at least 88 occasions, Real Time initiated telemarketing calls to Virginia residents whose telephone numbers had been registered on the National DO-NOT-CALL Registry in violation of the TCPA, 47 C.F.R. § 64.1200(c)(2), and other TCPA regulation provisions.

        The magistrate judge found that the Commonwealth could bring an action on behalf of its residents to receive statutory damages for each violation of $500.00, and that courts had the discretion to award $1,500.00 if the violation was willfully or knowingly committed.
       
        The Commonwealth requested $1,500.00 per each of 133 violations made in 88 telephone calls, for a total of $196,500.00 in statutory damages.  
 
        Importantly, the magistrate judge determined that the complaint sufficiently outlined the willfulness of Real Time’s conduct, as follows:
The number of calls made to individuals on the National Do-not-call Registry; the denial that such registration prohibited the solicitation, and attempts to continue the solicitation; and, the failure to maintain a list of individuals who specifically asked not to receive future calls from Real Time, and subsequent calls to many of those individuals, are all indications that Real Time’s violations of the statute were willful.
...
        The Commonwealth of Virginia has established by a preponderance of the evidence 133 willful violations of the TCPA by Real Time resulting in $196,500.00 in statutory damages....

        The district judge adopted the report and recommendations of the U.S. magistrate judge.  (A copy of the case and the Civil Docket for Case No. 4:04-CV-00125 was attached to Ms. Mey’s Pre-Hearing Brief.)  

        In so ruling, the district judge ruled in accord with the statute that a telephone solicitation victim may recover for more than one violation per telephone call.
The Arbitrator should follow the foregoing law and award Ms. Mey her statutory damages for each violation, rather than for each call.  The increase in Discover’s economic responsibility in this case and potentially others under similar circumstances may assist in decreasing additional violations on the part of Discover and its agents.  Simply put, an increase in the potential liability of Discover may serve to encourage Discover to redesign its current scrubbing procedures and to possibly implement new effective procedures.  After all, Mr. Durst admitted to Discover’s financial incentive in making its telephone solicitations.
Consequently, by providing a greater financial dis-incentive for initiating calls in violation of federal statute and regulations and finding liability on a per violation, rather than per call, basis, companies like Discover may more readily implement the regulatory requirements into their policies and procedures.  It is clear that they do not do it otherwise - and not even after suit has been filed.  
 
        An example is the July, 2006 telephone call that Discover initiated to Ms. Mey at her residence; although the call was initiated to a number which was different than that called in January, 2003, it was nevertheless registered on the National DO-NOT-CALL Registry since June, 2003.        
Therefore, the TCPA statute, and federal Virginia  case precedent entitle Ms. Mey to recover for more than one regulatory violation per call.

(B)     Discover failed to give identification information

        The Code of Federal Regulations, at 47 C.F.R. §64.1200(e)(2)(iv),  required the telemarketers who initiated the four calls to Ms. Mey to “...provide [Ms. Mey] with the name of the individual caller, the name of the person or entity on whose behalf the call is being made, and a telephone number or address at which the person or entity may be contacted,” as a matter of course.  

        The telemarketers in the four different calls not only failed to provide all the required information in each of the four calls, but were also inconsistent in their failures.   In the January 17th call, the telemarketer failed to provide any identifying information.  In the January 24th call,  the telemarketer failed to provide the name of the telemarketer, or the telephone number or address at which the telemarketer could be contacted.   In the January 28th and 30th calls, the telemarketers failed to   provide the telephone number or address at which the telemarketer could be contacted.  Consequently, the telemarketers were inconsistent in the manner in which they violated the regulation.

        Moreover, failure to comply with federal statute and regulations requiring that the solicitors provide Ms. Mey with identifying information not only violates federal law, but also hinders the ability to seek redress not only of Ms. Mey, but of anyone else in such circumstances.

(C)     Discover failed to record the do-not-call requests at time made

        The Code of Federal Regulations, at 47 C.F.R. §64.1200(e)(2)(iii), required the telemarketers to record Ms. Mey’s telephone requests and place her name and telephone number on the do-not-call list at the time the requests were made.  In the January 17th call, the telemarketer hung up on Ms. Mey in response to her request to have her number added to the do-not-call list.  In the January 28th call, the telemarketer responded to Ms. Mey’s request by saying that it was easy to add her number to the do-not-call list, but then hung up on Ms. Mey instead of doing it.  In the January 24th and 30th calls, although the telemarketers indicated that they added Ms. Mey’s residential telephone number to the do-not-call list, Discover never produced any such listing(s) in discovery.  Consequently, it is doubtful that the telemarketers recorded the do-not-call requests or  placed her name and telephone number on the do-not-call list at the time the requests were made.

(D)     Discover failed to honor Ms. Mey’s do-not-call requests

        In addition to Discover’s agents’ violations and inconsistencies in failing to record, the agents likewise failed to properly honor Ms. Mey’s do-not-call requests in January, 2003, in violation of 47 C.F.R. §64.1200(e)(2)(vi).  Accordingly, not only did Ms. Mey request Discover to place her residential phone number of 304-242-1943 on its do-not-call list in October, 2002, (Exhibit G, exhibit booklet, at 32-34), Ms. Mey made similar requests in the January 17th, 24th, 28th, and 30th calls.  It is apparent from the transcript that Discover violated her requests by initiating these calls.  Furthermore, Mr. Durst  gave testimony indicating his recognition of Discover’s malfeasance.  

(E)      Discover failed to provide a written policy for maintaining a do-not-call list
 
        On January 30, 2003, Ms. Mey requested Discover’s written do-not-call telemarketing policy.  The solicitor did not permit her to provide her name and address.  She never received the policy.  Finally, on March 3, 2003, Stacy J. Sandler, Discover’s counsel, mailed Ms. Mey a policy in response to a late February, 2003 telephone conversation. This is in violation of 47 C.F.R. § 64.1200(e)(2)(i).  

(F)     Discover failed to properly train the solicitors in the existence and use of the do-not-call list

        Tony Durst testified on behalf of Discover that it was corporate policy for Discover to control and monitor the telemarketing procedures of its third-party vendors.  Such control and monitoring would ensure that the third-party vendors were in compliance with federal law TCPA law.
Even though the subject arbitration was based in large part on Discover’s violation of TCPA do-not-call regulations, the training manual that Discover produced in discovery  did not contain instruction or direction as to training in the proper implementation and use of do-not-call lists not to mention instruction or direction as to proper compliance with other federal TCPA regulations.  See Exhibit B, exhibit booklet, at 11.   

        Accordingly, the Arbitrator made an inquiry at the close of the Arbitration concerning the varied responses of the telemarketers to Ms. Mey’s questions and comments during the telephone calls at issue (a transcript for which appears at Exhibit H, exhibit booklet, at 35).  

        Discover’s actions show clear violations of 47 C.F.R. §64.1200(e)(2)(ii) by failing to adequately train their personnel and agents.  Exhibit F, exhibit booklet, at 30, evidences that agencies 17 and 31 initiated the calls on January 24th and January 30th to Ms. Mey’s residential phone number (304-242-1943).  Thus, two different agencies/vendors violated federal statutory and regulatory TCPA law at the times of these respective calls. Given that Discover is responsible for training these agencies, this fact signifies that Discover improperly trained the agencies, rather than the agencies’ mistakes of their own accord.   Discover ultimately remains liable under 47 U.S.C. § 227(c)(5) for all such violations.  
 
        In this case, however, in spite of Mr. Durst’s admission that Discover trains its vendors’ trainers, two of these vendors violated federal TCPA law.  Consequently, there is a systemic problem with Discover’s training protocol, one that apparently persists to this day (based partially on the more recent July, 2006 call to a number that has been on the National DO-NOT-CALL Registry since June, 2003).

(G)     Discover’s “mistake defense” is without merit

        Part of the reason for these violations of federal TCPA law is lack of care and concern for consumer privacy on the part of Discover.  Discover’s concern is the financial incentive it admitted to in making the calls.  Discover’s lack of concern for consumer privacy is directly evidenced by its defense that it reached someone by accident or mistake, and thus should not be penalized.  In doing so, Discover shows its callousness and indifference to consumer privacy in not admitting that regardless of whether Discover intentionally or unintentionally rings up people like Diana Mey, their privacy is still violated.  Simply put, regardless of Discover’s excuses, justification, or lack thereof, Discover invaded in unsolicited fashion Ms. Mey’s privacy, seclusion, and time in January, 2003.  Ms. Mey suffered inconvenience and annoyance, regardless of whom the telemarketers were attempting to reach; Discover’s position is that so long as it did not intend to reach Ms. Mey, then Ms. Mey’s suffering as a result of Discover’s mistake is uncompensable, and therefore irrelevant.

        This mindset is troubling and breeds the type of malfeasance and misfeasance seen in the case at hand.   With this in mind and in an attempt at stopping such ambivalence, the Federal Communications Commission (FCC) made a ruling on this  point in In re Consumer.Net v. AT&T Corp., No. E-98-46, FCC 99-401 (Dec. 28, 1999)(hereinafter, “Consumer.Net”) (produced previously with response to motion to dismiss), as discussed in Ms. Mey’s prior briefs.  

        Therein, the FCC noted that 47 C.F.R.  § 64.1200(e)(2)(iii), which provided that “the person or entity must record the [do-not-call] request and place the subscriber’s name and telephone number on the do-not-call list.....”, “...applies to a particular telephone number.....”  Consumer.Net, at  1.19.   Later in its decision, the FCC ruled as follows:
 
Because we find that the Commission’s rules require do-not-call lists to be maintained on a
telephone number
basis (rather than requiring requests from every individual at a particular
residence), we conclude that AT&T’s February 24, 1998 telephone solicitation violated the
Commission’s rules and orders.

Consumer.Net, at  1.36.

        Significantly, the FCC made this ruling based on the literal wording of the regulation, which applied a do-not-call request to a particular number, and for policy reasons, one of which is the fact that some consumers wishing to be placed on a do-not-call list will not want to provide telemarketers with their name. Consumer.Net, at  1.36.  Such consumers must still be placed on the do-not-call list based solely on their telephone number because “interpreting the rule more narrowly would defeat the objective of protecting consumer privacy.”  Id. at  1.36 (citing TCPA Memorandum Opinion and Order, 10 FCC Rcd at 12, 395, para. 9).  Further, “[t]he placement of the number on the do-not-call list may not be circumscribed by the telemarketer’s claim that it was trying to reach someone else at that same number”.  Id. at  1.36.  

        A second policy reason behind the FCC’s ruling was that allowing AT&T and companies such as Discover to “creat[e] a virtually irrefutable defense that the telemarketer was trying to reach ‘someone else’ at [the] number” “eviscerate[s] the policy goals of the statute in protecting telephone subscribers from unwanted telemarketing calls.” See Id. at  1.37.  

        The Arbitrator should give deference to this decision as the United States Supreme Court would.  In this regard, the United State Supreme Court has instructed courts   as follows:
The power of an administrative agency to administer a congressionally created * * * program necessarily requires the formulation of policy and the making of rules to fill any gap left, implicitly or explicitly, by Congress.  If Congress has explicitly left a gap for the agency to fill, there is an express delegation of authority to the agency to elucidate a specific provision of the statute by regulation.  Such legislative regulations are given controlling weight unless they are arbitrary, capricious, or manifestly contrary to the statute.  Sometimes the legislative delegation of authority to an agency on a particular question is implicit rather than explicit. In such a case, a court may not substitute its own construction of a statutory provision for a reasonable interpretation made by the administrator of an agency.  
Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., (1984), 467 U.S. 837, 843-844, cited by Charvat v. Dispatch Consumer Serv ., 95 Ohio St.3d 505, 508, 769 N.E.2d 829 (2002)(citations omitted).

        This would induce Discover to create and implement a more effective privacy-protection policy.  

(H)     Violations of the first call are not exempt from the statutory penalty

        As to Discover’s position that only the second of two calls initiated within the same 12 month period is actionable, it is not only contrary to the literal language of the TCPA statute, but also is contrary to the policy underlying the statute.  First, as quoted above, section 227(c)(5) does not provide that only the second of the two calls is actionable.  Rather, it states that a victim of telephone solicitation may recover for “violation of the regulations.”  47 U.S.C. § 227(c)(5).  
Second, as stated in Rice v. Vacations Outlet of Colorado, L.L.C., No. 97CV3745 (June 1998),

The language of the TCPA...indicates that a telephone solicitation that in any way violates the act or any regulations prescribed under the statute may provide grounds for a private action.  Thus, the original call could be a violation of the act if the employee was not properly trained as required by 47 C.F.R. § 64.1200(e)(2)(ii).  ... The reasoning of the court in Szefczek is the most persuasive, as it most closely follows the language of the TCPA.  Following the reasoning of Szefczek as the Plaintiff argues, the Plaintiff does not have to show that both phone calls violated the do-not-call provisions of the TCPA.  In order to prevail in court, Plaintiff would have to demonstrate that each call was a solicitation which violated one or more provisions of the act or its regulations.  

        Allowing telemarketing companies a safe-harbor provision that exculpates them from liability for the first call encourages policies such as that of Discover wherein the telephone numbers of 11.9 million cardmembers who request to be placed on the do-not-call request are not scrubbed against the millions of campaign numbers to be called, solicited, and telemarketed.  TCPA concern is aimed towards protecting consumer privacy, and not the encouragement of slothfulness and laxness by telemarketers and their principals utilized in such a way to maximize profits.     
 
(I)     Discover’s violations were willful and knowing because Discover knew or should have known its policies and procedures were ineffective in preventing prohibited telephone solicitation

        The Arbitrator should likewise refuse Discover’s position that its policies and procedures are effective most of the time.  First, this position allows for idleness and stagnation of attempts at compliance with federal law.  If it is not broke, do not fix it.

        Additionally, calls to Ms. Mey may not be justified or excused because of the purported effectiveness of Discover’s policies and procedures since Discover’s policies and procedures are not effective.  At the Arbitration, Mr. Durst testified on behalf of Discover that Discover had 17 million cardmembers at present which were on Discover’s do-not-call list, and that about 11,900,000 (70% of 17 million) cardmembers were on Discover’s do-not-call list in 2003.  

        Mr. Durst likewise testified that although telephone numbers from do-not-call lists are compared to (scrubbed against) other phone numbers in attempt to honor nonsolicitation requests, Discover did not use its 11.9 million telephone numbers to scrub its telephone solicitation lists for the December, 2002/January, 2003 campaign.  This is in contravention of federal law which, under such circumstances, should necessarily impose a duty on Discover to scrub those numbers against its caller lists.

        Given that Discover initiates approximately 15,000,000 telemarketing solicitation calls per year to residential telephone numbers, some of which belong to both non-cardmembers and cardmembers who are on Discover’s do-not-call list, such as Ms. Mey’s residential telephone number, Discover clearly knew that  some of these calls will be initiated to the cardmembers listed on the do-not-call list.
 
        This system was certainly ineffective as to Ms. Mey because Discover’s campaign records reflected that 3 different individuals living at 3 different addresses each had the same telephone number as that of Ms. Mey in January, 2003, and which Ms. Mey instructed Discover to place on its do-not-call list in the fall of 2002.Exhibit F, exhibit booklet, at 29-31; Exhibit G, exhibit booklet, at 32-34.  Discover knew very well that calling the same phone number time and time again in attempt to solicit a non-cardmember(s)  reach people such as Ms. Mey who specifically instructed that their telephone number be placed on the do-not-call list.

        Moreover, Discover also knew of the potential for violations insofar as Ms. Mey’s number was a recyled number.  Even though Discover may argue that the number had been “recycled” from Ms. Mey to the three new people, Discover took no steps to ensure that if the number was dialed, the call would not be initiated to Ms. Mey’s residential phone line.

        Further, although federal law required Discover to record Ms. Mey’s October 29th, 2002  do-not-call request at the time of its making, i.e. October 31st, 2002, the request was not recorded as such on Discover’s mainframe account screen for the Mey account until February 21, 2003, almost 4 months subsequent to Ms. Mey’s request.  Exhibit E, exhibit booklet, at 22;  Exhibit Exhibit G, exhibit booklet, at 32-34.  This point notwithstanding, Discover’s system is so inefficient that Ms. Mey would have been called even if the October 31st request had been properly entered at the time of its making since Discover’s policy was not to scrub Ms. Mey’s residential telephone number, i.e. one of the 11, 900,000 numbers in Discover’s do-not-call list, on its campaign telephone solicitation numbers.
 
        Discover attempts to defend itself against these alarming facts by claiming that it receives few complaints.  Victims of telephone solicitation cannot complain, however, if they do not have contact information by which to voice their complaints.  Additionally, the vast majority of the American population is undoubtedly unaware of their TCPA rights.  In this regard, most lawyers probably do not even know the constituents of TCPA law.  Thus, there are undoubtedly numerous violations which go unaccounted for each day because people do not know their rights. Also, of those people who receive calls in violation of the TCPA who are aware of their rights, there may be numerous instances where they simply chose not to file an action, and just ignore the solicitation.

        In order for Ms. Mey to recover, Discover forced her to spend time and effort to file suit and arbitrate her case - this was when the calls at issue were tape-recorded and transcribed.  The question presents itself as to what happens in those cases in which the calls  have not been tape-recorded.  Along these lines, it is easier for Discover to refute people with less perseverance and determination for the vindication of consumer rights than Ms. Mey.  

        Thus, it is clear that Discover does not have an effective policy by virtue of which it may raise the affirmative defense in 47 U.S.C. § 227(c)(5).
Even if it did have such a defense,  Discover’s procedures were obviously ineffective to protect Ms. Mey.  Thus, Discover should be penalized for this violation, even assuming that its procedures were effective for everyone else, which they were not.   Case precedent supports this point.

        In Szefczek v. Hillsborough Beacon , 286 N.J. Super. 247, 251, 668 A.2d 1099 (1995), the plaintiff filed a TPCA claim, based on the defendant’s telephone calls to her,  which the trial court dismissed on the basis that the TCPA did not apply on its face. Id. at 253. Upon reconsideration, the court determined that the plaintiff did, in fact, state a cause of action based on the FCC regulations enacted under (c)(2) of the statute, and entered judgment for the plaintiff for $1,500.00.  Id. The defendant then filed a motion for a new trial, which was granted.  Id.  

        In its opinion, the court addressed whether the defendant violated the TCPA statute and determined that it did.  Id. at 266 - 268.  

        Importantly, the court went on to discuss the defendant’s reliance on the affirmative defense in section (c)(5) of the TCPA statute.   In this regard, the court ruled as follows:
 
The evidence has established that defendant did in fact establish and implement procedures to prevent violations of the regulations which were, for the most part, effective.  Therefore, defendant has an affirmative defense under the above language.  Clearly defendant’s procedures were not effective in this case, however.

Id
. at 268-69. The court then awarded damages to the plaintiff. Id. at 269.

        Therefore, given the egregious of Discover’s actions and its knowledge, (if it did not know, then it intentionally turned a “blind eye” towards the true state of affairs), treble damages are proper here, especially when considering the “knowing” and “willfully” standard, as discussed in Ms. Mey’s Pre-Hearing Arbitration Brief.
 
        Moreover, it bears noting that the precedent of the Eastern District in Virginia in Real Time also requires a ruling that Discover’s actions were wilful and knowing.  First,  like the Real Time defendant,  Discover called Ms. Mey on the four occasions in question after receiving notification that the new telephone number should not be called. Second, just as the Real Time defendant denied that the registration prohibited the solicitation, Discover denied that the applicable statutes and regulations prohibited phone call solicitations occurring after Discover processed a do-not-call request, but before a new campaign. Discover errs in this position - the law makes no such exception.  Third, Discover likewise hung-up on Ms. Mey in three of the four phone calls.  

        For these reasons, Discover should be found liable in the case at bar, notwithstanding its purported affirmative defense of  effectiveness under 47 U.S.C. § 227(c)(5).  

        If Discover has to pay treble damages for each of its violations in the January, 2003 calls, then this might serve to protect consumers in the future from being harassed as Ms. Mey was.  In the words of the United States Senator Earnest "Fritz" Hollings during his introduction of the Automated Telephone Consumer Protection Act, “They wake us up in the morning; they interrupt our dinner at night; they force the sick and elderly out of bed; they hound us until we want to rip the telephone right out of the wall."  137 Cong. Rec. 30,821 (1991).  Companies should be forced to obey the law.

        Therefore, the law, evidence, and arguments introduced in this case strongly support Ms. Mey’s originally requested award.

        WHEREFORE, the plaintiff, Diana Mey, respectfully  demands judgment against the defendant in the amount of One Thousand Five Hundred Dollars ($1,500.00) for each violation which the Arbitrator finds in this matter.                         

Respectfully submitted,
DIANA MEY, Plaintiff,
By:________________________________________
Of Counsel    
James A. Byrum, Jr. (WV Bar #576)
John M. Jurco, (WV Bar #9535)
Schrader, Byrd & Companion, PLLC
Suite 500, The Maxwell Centre
32 - 20th Street
Wheeling, WV  26003
Counsel for Plaintiff

    CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

On this ____ day of September, 2006, the undersigned hereby certifies that he served Discover Financial Services, Inc., the Arbitration Case Coordinator/JAMS, and the Arbitrator with the foregoing Closing Argument, as follows:   

William D. Wilmoth, Esq. (via  hand-delivery)
Melanie Norris, Esq.
Steptoe & Johnson, PLLC
1223 Main Street, Suite 3000
P. O. Box 751
Wheeling, WV  26003-0751
Counsel for Defendant, Discover Financial Services, Inc.

 
Carolina M. El’Azar (via UPS next day delivery and facsimile)
Arbitration Case Coordinator
JAMS
555 13th Street, NW
Ste. 400 West
Washington, D.C.
20004

Michael K. Lewis, Esq. (via UPS next day delivery and facsimile)  
Arbitrator
3508 Springland Lane, NW
Washington D.C. 20008-3119
DIANA MEY, Plaintiff,

By:_______________________________________
Of Counsel
James A. Byrum, Jr., Esq., (WV Bar #576)
John M. Jurco, (WV Bar #9535)
SCHRADER, BYRD & COMPANION, PLLC
The Maxwell Centre
32-20th Street, Suite 500
Wheeling, West Virginia 26003
(304) 233-3390